Latest Papers:

CO2 Abatement from RES Injections in the German Electricity Sector: Does a CO2 Price Help?
FoNEW Discussion Paper 2012/01, with Erik Delarue, and Denny Ellerman, available here
Abstract: The overlapping impact of the Emission Trading System (ETS) and renewable energy (RE) deployment targets creates a classic case of interaction effects. Whereas the price interaction is widely recognized and has been thoroughly discussed, the effect of an overlapping instrument on the abatement attributable to an instrument has gained little attention. This paper estimates the actual reduction in demand for European Union Allowances that has occurred due to RE deployment focusing on the German electricity sector, for the five years 2006 through 2010. Based on a unit commitment model we estimate that CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are reduced by 33 to 57 Mtons, or 10% to 16% of what estimated emissions would have been without any RE policy. Furthermore, we find that the abatement attributable to RE injections is greater in the presence of an allowance price than otherwise. The same holds for the ETS effect in presence of RE injection. This interaction effect is consistently positive for the German electricity system, at least for these years, and on the order of 0.5% to 1.5% of emissions.

Removing Cross-Border Capacity Bottlenecks in the European Natural Gas Market - A Proposed Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism, DIW Discussion Papers 1145, with Anne Neumann and Juan Rosellón, available here
Abstract: We propose a merchant-regulatory framework to promote investment in the European natural gas network infrastructure based on a price cap over two-part tariffs. As suggested by Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2010), a profit maximizing network operator facing this regulatory constraint will intertemporally rebalance the variable and fixed part of its two-part tariff so as to expand the congested pipelines, and converge to the Ramsey-Boiteaux equilibrium. We confirm this with actual data from the European natural gas market by comparing the bi-level price-cap model with a base case, a no-regulation case, and a welfare benchmark case, and by performing sensitivity analyses. In all cases, the incentive model is the best decentralized regulatory alternative that efficiently develops the European pipeline system.

7th Conference on Energy Economics and Technology, Dresden, Friday, 27th April, 2012. For more information please click here.